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Accomplice to Genocide Liability: The Case for a
Purpose Mens Rea Standard
Paul Mysliwiec*

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide
Convention' to prevent the Nazi atrocities from reoccurring.' For the next
forty years, the Genocide Convention went largely unused, not due to the
absence of genocidal conduct, but due to cold war politics.2 Since the fall of the
Soviet Union, the international community has increasingly relied on the
Genocide Convention, and this has created a jurisprudence of genocide.' This
development, combined with the relative decline of the role of state actors, has
created a much wider variety of genocidal scenarios than the drafters of the
Convention had in mind in 1948. 4
The purpose of this Comment is to address inconsistencies between
judicial interpretations in the UN ad hoc tribunals as to the mens rea for
accomplice liability of top state officials for genocide. The Comment will use, as
a case study, a recent Zimbabwean land-seizure program to show that courts
should apply a stricter, purpose-based standard, as opposed to a more expansive
knowledge-based standard, to judge accomplice liability. Section I provides an
overview of the Genocide Convention and recent cases involving the
interpretation and development of the jurisprudence governing genocide. This
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Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), 78 UN Treaty
Ser 278 (1951).
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jurisprudence, combined with the purpose, history, and various enforcement
issues particular to the Genocide Convention, bears critically on the normative
scope of accomplice liability. Section II describes the disastrous land
redistribution program in Zimbabwe that could possibly give rise to liability for
genocide under a knowledge-based regime. The government designed this
program to give land to its supporters, but the program was also associated with
racist rhetoric and attitudes, as government officials emphasized and
antagonized the racial division between their black supporters and the mainly
white landowners. Section III applies the Genocide Convention to this program,
showing possible avenues for prosecuting top Zimbabwean officials and noting
the two distinct applications of aiding and abetting liability. This section shows
that a knowledge mens rea standard for accomplice liability would subject top
party leaders to criminal liability for genocide, while a purpose standard would
not. Section IV argues that the majority mens rea requirement for accomplice
liability provides an overbroad application of the Convention, reigning in too
much conduct, and that the stricter, minority requirement is more appropriate to
achieve the objectives of the Genocide Convention.
II. THE LAW AGAINST GENOCIDE
A. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION'S IDIOSYNCRATIC
HISTORICAL CHARACTER
Following World War II, the UN set about drafting and adopting the
Genocide Convention. The drafting was greatly influenced by the Holocaust and
the Cold War. An observer could characterize the drafting as composing two,
slightly conflicting, purposes: to prohibit the specific atrocities committed by the
Nazis and Japanese and to limit this prohibition as much as possible, to prevent
criticism of US and Soviet Union policies.5 Most notably, the Sixth Committee
draft deleted "political groups" from the list of groups protected by the
Genocide Convention at the insistence of authoritarian regimes.6 The resulting
document does an excellent job at condemning historical atrocities, but has had
difficulties adjusting to equally horrific events that deviate from the Holocaust
mold.7 Despite this shortcoming, there have been no major textual changes to

s

See id at 452-53.
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See Matthew Lippman, The Draftingof the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide, 3 B U Ind L J 1, 42-43 (1985). But see Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive
Introduction 14 (Roudedge 2006).
See Caroline Fournet, The Crime of Destrueionand the Law of Genocide: Their Impact on CollectiveMemoy
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the Genocide Convention since its passage,8 and the label of genocide under the
Convention is still a major milestone for mobilizing international energy towards
humanitarian intervention. 9
B. THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
a. Killing members of the group;
b. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
calculated to
c. Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
bring about its destruction in whole or in part;
d. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
e.

10
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group ....

The "conditions of life" referred to in the definition were designed to be a
catch-all that encompassed situations in which the actor does not actually kill the
victim, but intends to cause a slow death that may or may not be realized. This
item was included, primarily, to prevent situations like "the ghetto, where the
Jews were confined in conditions which, either by starvation or by illness
accompanied by the absence of medical care, led to their extinction."" Yet it was
also intended to include a wide variety of conduct that could not be easily
described as "killing."' 2 The Genocide Convention thus prohibits actions that
fall short of actual killings.
Also of particular note in the text of the Convention is the requirement of
intent and the absence of a motive prerequisite. Scholars generally view the

for Human Rights Atrocties in InternationalLaw 246 (Oxford 1997) (discussing the difficulty of
defining the killings in Cambodia as a genocide). See also Alex de Waal, Reflections on the Difficulies
of Defining Dafur's Crisis a Genocide, 20 Harv Hum Rts J 25, 25-33 (2007).
8

Various parties attempted to amend the convention in 1978 and 1985, however. See Lippman, 15
ArizJ Intl & Comp L at 463-68 (cited in note 6).

9

See generally, Michael J. Kelly, "Genocide"--The Power of a Label, 40 Case W Res J Intl L 147 (20072008).
Art 2, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (cited in note 1)

10

(emphasis added).
11
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William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law 166 (Cambridge 2000), quoting Ad Hoc
Committee on Genocide at 14, UN Doc. E/AC.25/SR.4 (Apr 7, 1948).
The drafting committees meant to include the encouragement of drug addiction under the
definition of genocide. However, where this prohibition is located is uncertain. It is proscribed
under either section (c) or as a mental harm under section (b). See John Quigley, The Genocide
Convention: An InternationalLaw Ana#sis 102 (Ashgate 2006).
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intent requirement as specific intent or dolus .pedalis.'3 "A specific intent offense
requires performance of the actus reus but in association with an intent or
purpose that goes beyond the mere performance of the act."' 4 This requirement
shrinks the variety of conduct that the Genocide Convention prohibits. For
genocide by killing, a perpetrator must have the purpose of destroying the group
when he or she commits the killing. If the killing only effectively destroys the
group (even if the actor is in full knowledge of this fact) the killing is not
genocide. 5
The Sixth Committee included the language "as such" in the text of the
Genocide Convention as a substitute for a list of motives. 6 The Committee
desired to increase the range of motives beyond the World War 11-era list of
racial purity and hate. 7 As opposed to the intent requirement, this has the effect
of widening the scope of conduct that the Genocide Convention prohibits,
while still requiring the prosecution to prove that the victim was targeted
because of his or her membership in a protected group.
C. JURISPRUDENCE OF GENOCIDE
1. Issues
Particular
Jurisprudence

to

the

Development

of

International

While there were almost no prosecutions in the forty years following the
passage of the Genocide Convention, since the end of the Cold War prosecutors
have made up for this lost time. The International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia ("ICTY, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"), and the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") have all invoked the
Genocide Convention in a number of decisions, providing convictions,
acquittals, and lengthy opinions that define its terms. A jurisprudence pertaining
to the interpretation of the Genocide Convention has developed as a result.
While international law has no formal principle of stare decisis, 8 the various
13

Schabas, Genocide in InternationalLaw at 214 (cited in note 11).
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Id at 218 (cited in note 11).
The requirement of purpose, instead of knowledge, is most evidenced by the fear of the drafters
that large-scale bombing campaigns would be made illegal as genocides. See Lippman, 3 BU Ind L
J at 42 (citing the New Zealand delegation as fearing that "bombing which might destroy
groups ... might be called a crime of genocide; but that would obviously be untrue') (cited in
note 6).
See Quigley, The Genocide Convention:An InternationalLawAnaysis at 120-21 (cited in note 12).
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See id at 123.
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See Statute of the International Court of Justice (June 26, 1945) art 59, 59 Stat 1031 ('The
decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in respect of that
particular case.').
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courts have cited one another in their decisions interpreting the Genocide
Convention, and the finality and relative success of their decisions have a
persuasive effect on future applications of the Convention. 9
Universal jurisdiction and the non-self-executing nature of the Genocide
Convention further hamper the development of a jurisprudence of genocide,
due to the wide variety of courts and statutes affecting the prosecution of
2
genocide. Genocide is subject to the principle of universal jurisdiction. " The
crime of genocide is so serious that any state has the power to prosecute it under
the banner of universal jurisdiction. This multi-jurisdictional nature can lead to
inconsistent results, as individual states incorporate the exact same Genocide
Convention terms into conflicting bodies of law. Rules of evidence, procedure,
and interpretation vary and can have strong effects on the enforcement of
identical statutes. For example, both common law and civil law courts might
incorporate the Genocide Convention's specific intent requirement, but these
two jurisdictions have different, and often conflicting, definitions of specific
intent.2 These different interpretations could lead to opposing verdicts under
different legal regimes, despite identical facts and statutory terms.
In addition to ICJ and ad hoc tribunal statutes, the Genocide Convention
also requires individual states to enact its terms in their criminal code. Each
country that ratified the Genocide Convention implemented the Convention's
provisions into their penal codes. Many states, however, made changes to the
Convention's provisions." While these changes have not yet had an effect on
specific cases, they make general and theoretical comparisons difficult.23
2. Current Application and Genocide Jurisprudence
Despite the difficulties of development, international prosecutors have
developed three avenues to criminal responsibility for genocide: direct
responsibility for genocide, aiding and abetting a genocide ("accomplice

19

20

21

22

23

See, for example, Prosecutorv Delaic, Case No IT-96-21-T, Judgment, 478 (ICTY Nov 16, 1998)
1071
(the ICTY citing the ICTR); Prosecutor v Nahimana, Case No ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment,
(Dec 3, 2003) (the ICTR citing the ICTY).
See Christopher K. Hall, UniversalJurisdiction:Developing and Implementing an Effective Global Strategy,
in Wolfgang Kaleck et al, eds, InternationalProsecutionof Human Rights Crimes 85-87 (Springer 2007).
See Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Note, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-based
Interpretation,99 Colum L Rev 2259, 2268-69 (1999).
See Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An InternationalAnaysis at 15-20 (cited in note 12). See also
Offenses against the Person and Reputation, RSC 1985, c C-46, §318(4) (Canada) (expanding the
protected groups to include sexual orientation).
The International Criminal Court has the possibility of resolving many of these discrepancies, but
this has yet to happen.
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liability"), and command responsibility for genocide. 24 Direct responsibility arises
when an actor is responsible for his or her-and only his or her-actions, while
accomplice liability and command responsibility are both forms of derivative
liability, whereby the accomplice or commander is responsible for another's
actions. These avenues of culpability interact and help define each other. This
interaction is crucial to this Comment's argument in favor of a stricter mens rea
requirement for accomplice liability, so a discussion of direct and command
responsibility is necessary for a proper understanding of accomplice liability.
a) Direct responsibilityfor genodde. Direct responsibility for genocide is
the most common and most intuitive form of responsibility for genocide. The
actus reus for direct responsibility is achieved if the actor performs items a-e of
Article 2 of the Genocide Convention. Thus, killing or causing serious bodily or
mental harm satisfies the actus reus requirement.
International courts, such as the ICTY and the ICTR, are unanimous that
the mens rea requirement for direct responsibility is specific intent or purpose."
They have defined the requirements for specific intent for genocide as consisting
of two elements: "(1) the prohibited act must be committed against an individual
because of his membership in a particular group and (2) as an incremental step
in the overall objective of destroying the group. ' 26 Thus, a killing without the
intent to destroy a protected group is not genocide. This mens rea requirement
is distinct from knowledge. "Knowledge is a subjective, practical certainty that a
particular result will occur in the ordinary course of events, but without any
positive desire to bring it about., 27 If an actor knows that his or her acts will
destroy a protected group, but the destruction was not the purpose of the act, he
or she is not liable for genocide. While this might seem like an odd exculpating
element for conduct with such horrible effects, the Cold War drafters of the
Genocide Convention were acutely worried about prohibiting large-scale
bombing campaigns that, incidentally, destroyed a protected group.28
While there is disagreement, most case law considers participation in a
common criminal enterprise or joint criminal enterprise ("JCE") to be a form of

24

25
26
27
28

Prosecutorv Blagojevic, Case No IT-02-60-T, Judgment, 683 (ICTY Jan 17, 2005) (discussing the
difference between command responsibility and accomplice liability). These three avenues ignore
liability for publishing "hate media," which is either included in aiding and abetting or is a
separate offense depending on the jurisdiction.
See Schabas, Genocide in InternationalLaw at 217-21 (cited in note 11). See, for example, Prosecutorv
Jelisic, Case No IT-95-10-T, Judgment, 86 (ICTY Dec 14, 1999).
Jeiic, IT-95-10-T, Judgment at 66 (citations omitted)).
David L. Nersessian, Whoops, I Committed Genocide! The Anomaly of Constructive Liabihfy for Serious
InternationalCrimes, 30 SUM Fletcher F World Aff 81, 83 (2006).
See Lippman, 3 BU Int LJ at 41-42 (cited in note 6).

Vol 10 No. 1

Accotpice to GenocideLiabilioy

Mysliuiec

direct responsibility for genocide.29 JCE liability exists when all members of the
30
enterprise act pursuant to a common plan and possess the same criminal intent.
Thus, the actus reus and mens rea for JCE liability are the same as for an
individual commission of genocide, but with the additional requirements of
more than one actor and a common plan. For example, in a bank robbery, the
stick-up artist and the getaway driver are both guilty of direct liability under the
theory of JCE, as they are both acting under the same plan. Both actors
and both possessed the same criminal intent, so both
committed the actus reus,
31
would be directly liable.
b) Aiding and abelfing a genodde. The UN ad hoc tribunals, in their
application of the Genocide Convention, have borrowed from the laws of
various states in creating accomplice liability for genocide. Accomplice liability
has led to the conviction of many defendants in the ad hoc tribunals for
genocide.3 2 Article 7(1) of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia Statute and Article 6(1) of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda provide that:
A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to
in Articles332 to 5 of the present Statute, shall be individually responsible for
the crime.
The two ad hoc tribunals have also discussed liability for complicity in genocide
as distinct from aiding and abetting genocide. This distinction has added to the
confusion regarding the elements of accomplice liability. However, most
commentators believe that there is at least considerable overlap between the two
theories, and it is unclear what the difference, if any, between the two forms of
liability is. 34 Adding to this confusion is the dearth of convictions for complicity

29

30
31
32

See Chile Eboe-Osuji, 'CompViity in Genodde' versus Aiding and Abeting Genocide, 3 J Intl Crim Just
56, 64-66 (2005) (noting that the ICTY, despite an occasionally conflicting judgment, has ruled
that joint criminal enterprise is a form of direct commission).
Id at 64-65.
See Nersessian, 30 SUM Fletcher F World Aff at 84 (discussing JCE liability in the bank robbery
scenario and possible JCE liability in a genocide scenario) (cited in note 27).
127 (ICTY Mar 15,
See, for example, Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Case No IT-97-25-T, Judgment,
2002); ProsecutorvAkayesu, Case No ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, 684 (Sept 2 1998).

33

Article 7, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Statute (1993), available
online at <http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icty-statut.pdf> (visited Apr 17, 2009); Article 6,
at
online
available
(1994),
Rwanda
for
Tribunal
Criminal
International
<http://www.un.org/ictr/statute.html> (visited Apr 17, 2009).

34

See Prosecutorv SemanZa, Case No ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment, 394 (May 15, 2003) ("There is no
material difference between complicity in article 2(3)(e) of the Statute and the broad definition
accorded to aiding and abetting in Article 6(1).). See also Grant Dawson and Rachel Boynton,
Reconclng Complicty in Genocide andAiding andAbetting Genocide in the Jurisprudenceof the United Nations
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in genocide and the short shrift courts give in discussing the theory because of
its alternative nature with a separate count of genocide.35 A conviction for aiding
and abetting precludes a conviction for complicity, so there is little discussion in
the ad hoc tribunals regarding complicity, as courts have often found the
defendant guilty of aiding and abetting and quickly disposed of the incompatible
count for complicity. For purposes of this Comment, all forms of accomplice
liability, including complicity, will be referred to as simply accomplice liability.
The actus reus for accomplice liability is that the defendant "carried out an
act which consisted of practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support to
the principal offender. '3 6 Further, the "act of assistance may be either an act or
omission, and it may occur before, during, or after the act of the principal
offender."37 This definition of the actus reus for accomplice liability covers a
wide swath of conduct.
The mens rea for accomplice liability is subject to a disagreement between
the courts reviewing the matter. Prosecutor v Jelisic, the minority view, holds that
the accomplice's mens rea standard is the same as that of the principal.38 Thus,
the accomplice must assist the principal with the purpose of destroying the group.
Prosecutorv Blagjevic, the majority view, holds that the accomplice is guilty of the
crime if "it is shown that he assisted in the commission of the crime in the
knowledge of the perpetrator's specific intent."3 9 Thus, under the majority
approach, the mens rea for an accomplice is lowered to knowledge. The
accomplice is liable for genocide if he or she assists and knows that the principal
intends to destroy the group, regardless of his or her desires in the situation.
Despite this disagreement, it is notable that either mens rea requirement for
accomplice liability, along with the broad actus reus requirements of the
Genocide Convention, has the potential to criminalize a large amount of
conduct.
c) Command responsibilityforgenocide. Because of the official and military
nature of the atrocities in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, prosecutors and courts have
Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 Harv Hum RtsJ 241, 276 (2008) ('The fact that the elements for both seem
to be identical suggests there truly is no practical difference between both these provisions, and
that any theories which might seem to properly explain their co-existence would not make any
substantial vertical difference in application.'). But see Eboe-Osuji, 3 J Ind Crim Just at 56 (cited
in note 29).
35
36

37
38

3

See Dawson and Boynton, 21 Harv Hum Rts J at 275-76 (cited in note 34).
Krnojelac, IT-97-25-T, Judgment at 88.
Id, 88.
Jeisic, IT-95-10-T, Judgment at

86. See also Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment at
that both the ICTY and the ICTR have held this position.

Blagojevic IT-02-60-T, Judgment at
in note 21).

485. Note

782. See also Greenawalt, 99 Colum L Rev at 2281-83 (cited
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invoked command responsibility, or superior criminal responsibility, ° to
prosecute violations of the Genocide Convention." Command responsibility
requires a superior-subordinate relationship.42 While an official command
relationship might be helpful in establishing a superior-subordinate relationship,
it is not required.4 3 The court uses the effective control test to determine
whether a superior-subordinate relationship exists.' The ICTY has defined
effective control as "the material ability to prevent or punish the commission of
the [subordinate's] offenses., 45 A court looks at the superior's ability to prevent
and punish the subordinate's activities to determine whether this relationship "is
similar to that of military commanders. 46 The doctrine, however, does not hold
civilian, military leadership-such as the US President-responsible for most
complex military actions in the field.47 Civilian leadership is deemed to be more
of a figurehead in the execution of complex military operations.
The actus reus for command responsibility, along with the requirement for
a superior-subordinate relationship, is that "the superior failed to take necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator
thereof."4 8 Thus, command responsibility is another form of accessory liability,
similar to accomplice liability, except that: (1) a special relationship between the
principal and the accessory is required and (2) a slightly broader mens rea exists,
as the explanation below describes.
"[T]he mens rea for superiors to be held responsible for genocide.., is
that the superiors knew or had reason to know that their subordinates (1) were
about to commit or had committed genocide and (2) that the subordinates
possessed the requisite specific intent.' 4'9 Thus, the mens rea required to hold a
superior responsible for genocide is knowledge or construcive knowledge. Command
responsibility mens rea is broader than even the majority view of accomplice

40

Superior criminal responsibility is the term used in a civilian context, while command
responsibility is the same principle in a military context. See Prosecutor v Bjdjanin, IT-99-36-T,
Judgment, 274 n 732 (ICTY Sept 1, 2004).

41

See, for example, id at 275. See generally Greg R. Vetter, Command Responsibi'y of Non-Mifitay
Superiorsin the InternationalCriminalCourt (ICC), 25 Yale J Ind L 89 (2000).
Blagojevic, ICTY-02-60-T, Judgment at 790 (cited in note 24).

42
43

See Daryl A. Mundis, Current Developments at the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 1 J Ind Crim
Just 520, 523 (2003).

44

Blagojevic, ICTY-02-60-T, Judgment at

45

Id,

46

Prosecutorv Delalic, Case No IT-96-21 -T, Judgment,

47

Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment at

48

Blagojevic, ICTY-02-60-T, Judgment at

49

Id,

791.

791 (citations omitted).

686 (citations omitted).
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liability, as it creates culpability despite an unreasonable mistake about the
principal's activities and intentions. This incredibly broad standard can lead to
the odd, and presumably rare, result of convicting a defendant of a crime that he
or she did not actually know occurred. ° The command responsibility doctrine
limits this widening, however, through the requirement of a superiorsubordinate relationship. Thus, the doctrine holds a military, or similar, superior
to a slightly higher standard than that of an ordinary person.
III. ZIMBABWE'S LAND SEIZURE PROGRAM
Zimbabwe achieved formal independence in 1980. Following
independence there were promises of land redistribution. While some smallscale land redistribution occurred immediately after independence, as of 1997 a
group of approximately 70,000 whites, who comprised 1 percent of the
country's population, still owned 45 percent of the arable land.5' Following a
referendum loss in February of 2000, President Robert Mugabe, head of the
ruling political party, ZANU-PF, instituted the "fast-track" land reform plan.
Fast-track land reform was an aggressive land redistribution regime designed to
garner political support.52 The regime consisted of the occasionally violent
occupation and seizure of white-owned farmland for redistribution to landless,
black Mugabe supporters. The policy resulted in the confiscation of almost all
white-owned farmland and the death of nearly a hundred white farmers and
their families.5 3
Fast-track land reform was hardly fast. It often involved Mugabe
supporters squatting on white-owned farms for months before finally seizing
complete control of the farms.54 Many white farmers lived in constant fear of
violence from their unwanted guests. The situation occasionally erupted into
mob violence and lynchings. 5
While Mugabe's motivation for the land redistribution was entirely political
and the motivation of most of his supporters was economic self-interest, racial
overtones ran throughout the policy. In discussing the land policy and the
attempts by white farmers to rein it in through litigation, Mugabe stated that
"our party must continue to strike fear in the hearts of the white man, our real
50

See generally Nersessian, 30 SUM Fletcher F World Aff 81 (cited in note 27).

51

See Trevor Grundy, White Farmers Fear Black 'Invasion, Scotland on Sunday (Oct 19, 1997). See
also White Xmas in Zimbabwe Comes with Fearand Menace, S African Press Ass (Dec 22, 2000).
See Judges Say Mugabe's Plan to Seize Land Owned by Whites is Illegal, Chicago Trib 9 (Nov 12, 2000).
See also State DepartmentIssues BackgroundNote on Zimbabwe, US Fed News (July 1, 2005).

52

53

See Douglas Marie, Mugabe Digs in with Farm Terror Campagn,Sunday Times 22 (Apr 13, 2008).

54

See Rachel L. Swarns, White FarmersFlee to MoZambique, NY Times 1A (Dec 16, 2001).

55

See Mare, Mugabe Digs in with Farm Terror Campaign,Sunday Times (cited in note 53).
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enemy," and that "an evil white alliance" was attempting to overthrow all black
governments in Southern Africa.5 6 Those surrounding Mugabe also influenced
these racial overtones. For example, the leader of Zimbabwe's "war veterans,"
the group carrying out the occupation of white-owned farms, preferred the
nickname "Hider."5 7 Reinforcing the theme that the redistribution was more
than a dividend to loyal Mugabe supporters, an aspect of punishment seems to
have pervaded the campaign. For example, Britain offered to organize and pay
for the seizures, but the Zimbabwean government refused,58 implying that the
government wanted the farmers to suffer. While the racial rhetoric and refusal of
British support does not prove a motivation different from politics and the
redistribution of wealth, it shows that Mugabe and senior Zimbabwean
leadership were aware of widespread racial hatred and animosity in the country.5 9
IV. APPLICATION OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION TO
ZIMBABWE
At first glance, the actions in Zimbabwe do not appear to constitute
genocide and are surely not what the drafters had in mind when they created the
Genocide Convention. Zimbabwe in 2002 is very different from Poland in 1942.
However, the majority view of accomplice liability could create liability for
President Mugabe and other senior ZANU-PF leadership. A knowledge-based
mens rea requirement prohibits a very wide variety of conduct and requires only
a very tenuous connection between the accomplice and the principal. This
factor, along with the broad and foreseeable consequences of government
action, can lead to liability for top government officials.
The issue of whether white Zimbabweans constitute a "national, ethnic,
racial or religious group" protected by the Genocide Convention is complex, but
a court would almost certainly find that they do. It is unclear what type of
group-national, ethnic, or racial-white Zimbabweans would fall under, and
the Genocide Convention does not define these groups. It appears that white
Zimbabweans are not easily categorized as a national, ethnic, or racial group;
they have elements of each category. The ICTR was reluctant to consider these
groups exclusive of each other, however, when considering the status of the

56

Trevor Grundy, Mugabe Rages against Whites as Violence Threatensto Explode, Sunday Herald 17 (Dec
17, 2000).

57

See Chenjerai Hunmi, 51, Leader of Farm Takeovers in Zimbabwe, NY Times B10 (June 5, 2001).
Rachel L. Swarns, ForZimbabwe White Farmers, Time to Move on, NY Times 1 (Aug 4, 2002).

58

59

It is not enough in a prosecution for genocide that the Mugabe government benefitted from this
animosity, as the specific intent requirement requires the intent to destroy.
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Tutsi. 6° The court allowed protected group status for groups comprising a blend
of the enumerated characteristics. 6' The court considered the enumerated classes
in the Genocide Convention as examples of protected groups, rather than
exclusive categories. Along these same lines, a protected group according to the
ICTR was a "stable and permanent group, ' 2 which white Zimbabweans surely
are. The court, while not providing a comprehensive list of factors, named
membership by birth as a characteristic of a stable and permanent group. 3 The
permanency and stability of skin color, membership through birth, and the
agreement by both whites and blacks within Zimbabwe support the
determination that white Zimbabweans would be a protected group under the
64
The Genocide Convention thus applies to the killing of
Genocide Convention.
65
Zimbabweans.
white
A. DIRECT LIABILITY FOR ZANU-PF OFFICIALS FOR
GENOCIDE
There is a very weak case for subjecting President Mugabe and top ZANUPF officials to direct criminal liability for genocide based on the violent seizure
of white-owned farms. Mugabe did not actually kill, but Mugabe could possibly
be liable for allowing landless blacks to live on white farms and for the fear that
this imposed on the farmers. His actions would possibly satisfy one of the actus
reus categories of "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group" or "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its destruction in whole or in part."66 Serious bodily or mental harm
is notably undefined in the Genocide Convention and little in the travaux
priparatoires defines the term.67 The Israeli court that decided Eicbmann
considered "enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution" as mental
60
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harms prohibited by the statute.6 8 The court in Prosecution v Akayesu, however,
has stated that rape constitutes both a physical and a mental harm under the
Convention.69 A court could find that Mugabe satisfied the actus reus of
inflicting serious mental harm on the white farmers by allowing angry, landless
squatters on their farms.
The presence of the black squatters on the land might also qualify under
the "conditions of life" actus reus, although this is a harder case. The
government's encouragement of the squatters was very harmful to white farmers
and created a situation where it was only a matter of time before more grave
events erupted. The qualifiers "deliberately" and "calculated" in Article 2(c) of
the Genocide Convention, however, probably prevent this government action
from satisfying the standard. There was very little deliberate calculation in
allowing the squatters on the farms. In fact, it was the opposite of a deliberate
calculation: it was a reckless and disorganized strategy. Thus, the actus reus of
creating genocidal conditions of life is probably not satisfied.
Even if Mugabe's actions satisfy the actus reus for genocide, the mens rea
is almost certainly not satisfied. Genocide requires the specific intent, or dolus
ipedalis, to destroy a group because it is a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group.70 The purpose of Mugabe's policy of fast-track land reform was shoring
up votes. While Mugabe gave little weight to the plight of the white farmers, no
court has yet found that ambivalence is equivalent to purpose.
Likewise, Mugabe and top ZANU-PF officials could not be convicted of
genocide through a theory of JCE liability because the purpose of the top party
leadership for their actions was to keep their jobs, not to kill. Mugabe does not
possess the requisite mens rea, so the application of JCE liability fails to fix the
same weakness that a prosecution under traditional direct liability has. Thus,
Mugabe and top ZANU-PF officials are almost certainly not liable for genocide
under any direct theory of liability.
B. ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR ZANU-PF OFFICIALS FOR
GENOCIDE
The case against President Mugabe and other top ZANU-PF officials
becomes much more plausible when the principle of accomplice liability is used,
especially if the majority view of mens rea is applied. Accomplice liability is a
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form of derivative liability that requires a guilty principal.7 ' In the case of the
Zimbabwe land seizures, there was probably a guilty principal. A guilty principal
may consist of a single, landless, Mugabe supporter who wished to rid the world
of white Zimbabweans. The Genocide Convention is so broad that an individual
black supremacist that killed one or more white farmers could be convicted of
genocide.72 He or she would have committed the actus reus, a killing, and would
have had the requisite mens rea, intent to destroy a protected group. Notably,
the intent requirement does not require an actor to have the ability to completely
destroy a protected group. As the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v Krstic
stated, "The intent to destroy formed by a perpetrator of genocide will always be
limited by the opportunity presented to him."73 Thus, the consequences beyond
the initial killing are irrelevant to a charge of genocide and a hate-filled,
murderous Mugabe supporter would qualify under the Genocide Convention.
The actus reus for aiding and abetting is any act of "practical assistance,
encouragement, or moral support to the principal. 7 4 Mugabe, by allowing and
encouraging squatters onto the land of white farmers, and not enforcing
trespassing laws certainly satisfies this requirement. In Prosecutorv Simic, the court
held that interviewing prisoners on television gave moral support, which was
enough to satisfy the actus reus for accomplice liability. 5 In Prosecutor v Mrksic,
the court held that removing the guards that prevented angry soldiers from
attacking prisoners of war satisfied the actus reus standard. 6 Mugabe's
supporters would have been unable to take over the white-owned farms without
his enactment of the fast-track laws, and Mugabe's public statements certainly
count as encouragement. Thus, there is little doubt that Mugabe and other top
ZANU-PF officials have committed the actus reus for accomplice liability.
The more contentious issue is whether Mugabe had the requisite mens rea
for accomplice liability. This determination depends on which standard for
liability is used. Mugabe is liable under the majority view, while under the
minority view he is not. The majority view, as noted in Blagojevic, requires that the
71
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defendant (1) has knowledge that his or her actions would contribute to the
actions of the principal, and (2) knew that the principal had the requisite specific
intent."7 Notably, there is no requirement that the accomplice know the specific
identity of the principal. In Prosecutor v Vasi/evic, the defendant was found guilty
for accomplice liability despite his, and the court's, ignorance of the identity of
the principal." All that is required is knowledge that a guilty principal exists.
Mugabe's racially tinged speeches show that he was acutely aware of the racial
tensions present in the country, most notably the hate felt by landless blacks
against whites. This awareness constitutes knowledge that a few blacks would,
given the chance, attempt to drive out or kill all white Zimbabweans. While
more detailed evidence would be required to prove knowledge at a trial,
Mugabe's intimate knowledge of the racial tensions present in the country likely
proves that he had knowledge of the principals' specific intent to commit
genocide.
Mugabe was also aware his actions would help the principal commit
genocide. Mugabe was likely knowledgeable that allowing large numbers of his
landless black supporters to camp lawlessly on white farms would contribute to
the killing of the whites who owned those farms. Therefore, he was aware that
his actions would "contribute to the actions of the principal" as required under
the majority mens rea test.79 In defense, Mugabe might argue that his mental
state did not amount to knowledge, but was a step short, at recklessness or gross
negligence. He would argue that because he was only aware of a large chance, he
did not possess knowledge. Recklessness, as defined by the American Model
Penal Code, is "the conscious disregard of an objectively substantial and
unjustifiable risk."8 But the argument that Mugabe was reckless and not
knowledgeable is unlikely to prevail because, in the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals at least, the courts do not slice mens rea that thin.81 In the
jurisprudence of the tribunals, the divide between intentional and unintentional
is that "the death should not be an accidental consequence of the acts of the
accused. 8 2 Further, even in legal systems that more finely grade mens reasystems that differentiate conduct into more categories-creating a high
probability satisfies a knowledge requirement.8 3 Mugabe creating a situation of
77
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lawlessness on white farms in a country with very severe racial tensions creates
that large chance. Thus, under the majority view, a court could probably convict
Mugabe and senior ZANU-PF leadership of accomplice liability for genocide.
The minority view leads to an opposite conclusion. Under the view of
accomplice liability held by the court in Jeisic, the mens rea requirement is the
same for both the principal and the accomplice. 84 Thus, Mugabe would need the
specific intent to commit genocide to be liable as an accomplice. In other words,
the purpose of the fast-track land reform program must have been to assist or
encourage his supporters to commit genocide. The purpose of assisting genocide
was almost certainly lacking. By initiating the fast-track land reform, Mugabe
wanted to both reward his political supporters and punish his political enemies.85
He definitely did not intend to destroy white Zimbabweans "in whole or in
part." Evidence would likely indicate that he did not wish this to happen at all.
The deaths and mayhem that resulted from the policy led to international
condemnation and a huge decline in the Zimbabwean economy. Mugabe wanted
a quick, easy, and painless transfer of property. Thus, under the minority view, a
court would probably not find Mugabe and other top ZANU-PF supporters
liable for genocide.
C. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR ZANU-PF OFFICIALS FOR
GENOCIDE
Mugabe and top ZANU-PF leadership are also unlikely to be guilty of
genocide under a command theory of liability. The doctrine of command
responsibility applies mainly to military commanders and political officials.86 It
subjects the commander to criminal liability for the crimes of his or her
subordinates that the commander was or should have been aware of.87 The most
obvious situation subjecting the superior to liability for the crimes of a
subordinate is when the superior has given a specific order, although a court
may also hold a superior criminally liable despite the absence of a formal
command:
[T] he mental element necessary when the commander has not given the
offending order is (a) actual knowledge, (b) such serious personal dereliction
on the part of the commander as to constitute wilful and wanton disregard
of the possible consequences, or (c) an imputation of constructive
knowledge, that is, despite pleas to the contrary, the commander, under the
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case, must have known of the
facts and circumstances of the particular
88
offenses charged and acquiesced therein.

When the theory of command responsibility is applied to Mugabe's fast-track
land reform policy, it appears that the mens rea requirement is satisfied for the
reasons discussed in Section IV.B. However the actus reus requirement is not
met. Mugabe and top ZANU-PF officials do not have a superior-subordinate
relationship with their landless supporters. A politician, no matter how powerful,
is not a commander of his or her supporters. While a political leader has a
responsibility to prevent and punish the actions of his or her constituents, this
relationship does not look like a military command relationship. Mugabe did not
"exercise a military-like degree of control" over his supporters.89 Thus, Mugabe
and top ZANU-PF officials are probably not liable for genocide under a theory
of command responsibility.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE THREE METHODS OF LIABILITY FOR
GENOCIDE AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE MENS REA FOR
ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY

The reasoning behind the majority perspective is probably due to its basis
in states' criminal law. In many common law countries, the mens rea for an
accomplice is knowledge for more serious crimes and purpose for less serious
crimes. 9° Under this logic, courts should hold accomplices to genocide, the
"crime of all crimes," to a knowledge standard. This logic fails, however, because
genocide is different from most crimes, due to its relevance to government
actions and its role in international law. These reasons favor a purpose mens rea
standard.
The split between the majority and minority view on the mens rea
requirement for genocide must be viewed under the overall scheme of
enforcement of the Genocide Convention, the Genocide Convention's
provisions regarding top government officials, the role the Genocide
Convention plays in the international community, and the preference in
international criminal law for limited discretion. When viewed against these

factors, the minority view's purpose requirement for accomplice liability is a
more appropriate standard to achieve the goals of the Genocide Convention.
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A. ARTICLE IV OF THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION CREATES
GOVERNMENT LIABILITY UNLIKE ORDINARY CRIMES
The lack of sovereign immunity as a defense to prosecution under the
Genocide Convention makes knowledge an unsuitable standard when applied to
governmental officials and certain actions they might take in their official
capacity. Article IV of the Genocide Convention reads: "[p]ersons committing
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished,
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private
individuals."'" This provision provides that sovereign immunity is not an
effective defense to charges of genocide, and that government officials, even
acting in their official capacities, may be liable for genocide. This provision,
combined with an expansive definition of accomplice liability, criminalizes a
huge host of government actions as genocide. Government activities have large
effects on society and can influence a variety of people in a variety of ways. Even
good government programs often have negative repercussions. For example,
there is a risk of death from the smallpox vaccine and large-scale vaccination
inevitably results in deaths.92 Without official immunity, a mens rea requirement
of knowledge could result in a conviction for manslaughter for officials
authorizing a smallpox vaccination program. Yet eradicating smallpox is likely a
legitimate government purpose, even if it is not costless to do so. A mens rea
requirement that ties criminal culpability to negative effects based on mere
knowledge of those effects can make many government programs criminal. This
is an absurd and counterproductive result. Governmental officials need the
freedom to make difficult choices in full knowledge of inevitable bad effects.
They need this freedom to promote programs where the benefits actually
outweigh the costs or because the official's ex ante calculation of the benefits
outweigh the costs. As a result, government programs requiring the smallpox
vaccine are not criminal. An exception to this principle for genocide is arbitrary
and counterproductive to many beneficial goals. A mens rea requirement of
purpose allows governments to make these choices without the help of official
immunity.
B. THE THREE AVENUES OF CULPABILITY FOR GENOCIDE
A stricter mens rea requirement of purpose fits into the overall
enforcement scheme of the Genocide Convention better than does a
91
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requirement of knowledge. A well-functioning enforcement scheme connects
the mens rea requirement to the association between the accomplice and the
principal. There should be a broader mens rea requirement for principals and
accomplices with a close relationship, and a narrower mens rea requirement for
principals and accomplices with little to no relationship.
Traditional criminal-law definitions of accomplice liability are not effective
in governing situations where a single accomplice affects a large number of
potential principals. Accomplice liability works effectively in situations where a
getaway driver assists in a bank robbery because there is an easily viewable, ex
ante limit to the responsibility of the driver. But this system breaks down when
the accomplice is the president who passes legislation allowing cars and paving
roads. The president knows that he is helping bank robberies, but he does not
have that purpose. Bank robberies are not the president's main concern, nor
even a material one.
The command responsibility theory of liability solves this problem. It
allows for knowledge to serve as the basis for liability, but limits the principals
for whom the government official is liable to those under his or her effective
control. When command responsibility and the minority view of accomplice
liability are used in conjunction with each other, a well-functioning system of
culpability is established. The government official has more liability the closer
the relationship is, but the official remains responsible for widespread genocidal
activities he or she purposely intends to occur. A system creating a constructive
knowledge standard for closely associated principals, but a purpose standard for
more distant principals, creates a quasi-official immunity system. A government
official benefits from a stricter mens rea standard for actions taken as a
policymaker than for actions taken in other roles, as the official is unlikely to
have a command relationship with potential principals in large government
initiatives. There is still liability for the official if he or she acts purposefully,
however, and there is, potentially, a broader liability standard when the official
acts in a non-policymaking role. Thus, an accomplice liability standard of
purpose creates a system that makes a distinction between a government official
acting in an official or personal capacity, and exculpates officials enacting good
faith government policies.
C. GENOCIDE'S ROLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
A separate, but still very substantial, reason for tightening the mens tea
requirement for accomplice liability is the role the legal finding of genocide plays
in the international community. A claim and subsequent finding of genocide has
become a bellwether of international support for both international intervention
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and condemnation. 93 A broader definition of genocide subverts this role.
Zimbabwe is an excellent example. The catastrophe of Mugabe's fast-track land
reform policy is not genocide under the ordinary understanding of the term. It
was an ill-conceived plan, coupled with populist rhetoric. A court calling the
policy genocide is unlikely to have an effect on international action towards the
country, but would weaken the stigma that name carries with it in future cases.
International observers heavily criticized the UN's International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur for refusing to use the "G" word when investigating Darfur.94
The attention focused on this refusal, however, emphasizes the importance of
the label and the corresponding importance of maintaining its integrity. A mens
rea standard of knowledge leads to an over-application of the Genocide
Convention, which can have the disastrous effect of weakening a tool for
mobilizing the international community.
D. EFFECTS OF ACQUITTING DEFENDANTS WITH
KNOWLEDGE BUT NOT PURPOSE
A criticism of implementing a purpose standard for genocide is that it
exculpates a large amount of bad behavior that would otherwise be punished.
For example, dictators like Mugabe-who are fully aware of the consequences
their actions will have-will not be dissuaded. But this fear is unfounded, as
many other criminal prohibitions target similar conduct. The ICTY found the
defendant in Jelisic not guilty of genocide, in part because of the stricter standard
of accomplice liability. 95 However Mr. Jelisic was also convicted of fifteen counts

of crimes against humanity and sixteen counts of violating the law of war, all of
which pertained to the same conduct as his genocide acquittal.96 He is currently
serving a forty-year prison sentence. 97 The crime of genocide is only one tool in
an ever-expanding international arsenal, and reserving it for the clearest cases is
the most prudent decision.
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E. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IS NOT A MORE EFFECTIVE
SOLUTION TO OVERBROAD GENOCIDE LIABILITY

A move to a purpose-based mens rea requirement is a relatively blunt tool
to fix the problem of holding government officials liable for genocide despite
their lack of a genocidal intent. Critics of a purpose-based mens rea might
suggest that the solution to this problem is the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion. This criticism is lacking because of difficulties inherent to the
application of prosecutorial discretion to the international criminal law arena
such as: the potential for politicization of the prosecution, overlapping
jurisdiction, and the opportunity for abuse. These difficulties encourage a stricter
definition of accomplice liability. Further, these difficulties display the keen need
to limit overly broad applications of the Genocide Convention through
limitations in the law as opposed to the administration of that law. A mens rea
standard of purpose does just that.
Prosecutorial discretion is the jurisdictional equivalent of death and taxes.
While the Genocide Convention is enforceable in a large number of
jurisdictions98 with a wide variety of procedures, prosecutorial discretion is
present in all jurisdictions, as it is a function of both the constant constraint of
99
limited resources and the universal need for individualized justice. Proponents

claim that a wide use of prosecutorial discretion would limit the potentially
overbroad culpability a knowledge-based mens rea requirement creates, while
allowing prosecutors to avoid the difficult evidentiary test of proving purpose
for top government officials.' 0 Prosecuting top government officials for
genocide requires an ability to subject those officials to some sort of jurisdiction,
which almost inevitably requires some sort of regime change. Regime change
can be a messy affair and often leads to the purposeful and accidental
destruction of evidence. The need for regime change, coupled with the fact that
evidence to establish an accomplice government official's mens rea is less likely
to come from eyewitness testimony than a paper record, creates large practical
difficulties in prosecuting top government officials for genocide.'
While attractive, heavy reliance on prosecutorial discretion is impractical
due to the nature of international criminal law adjudication. The chief factors
98
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that make this solution impractical are: (1) the political fragility of genocide
prosecutions; (2) the potential for abuse; and, most importantly, (3) the lack of a
single prosecutor to exercise discretion.
1. Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion Binds a Potential Defendant to
Counterbalance the Politicization and Legitimacy Problems of
Genocide Prosecutions
Genocide prosecutions of top government officials are inevitably
politicized affairs. For example, the UN had to walk the tightrope in the former
Yugoslavia of conducting peace negotiations with the same individuals it was
planning to prosecute.0 2 This politicization can lead to bargaining between the
accused, or potentially accused, and the forum. If prosecutorial discretion plays a
large role in a forum, there are more "chips" to trade. Likewise, if prosecutorial
discretion plays a small role in a forum, there are fewer chips to trade. A rule
that reduces a prospective court's tradable chips supports the goals and
legitimacy of the Genocide Convention. In the sorts of extreme situations in
which the Genocide Convention is at issue, notions of justice require a fill
adjudication of the events and all of their actors. The requirement for
comprehensive justice is the purpose behind the Genocide Convention's
abandonment of sovereign immunity.'0 3 This purpose would be thwarted if the
leaders could escape prosecution by bargaining themselves out of liability. By
constraining prosecutorial discretion, a prospective forum constrains potential
defendants as well, assuring that all prosecutable individuals are prosecuted in
fact.
This binding of potential forums also increases the legitimacy of courts
adjudicating genocide, which can have tremendous practical benefits to the
administration of justice in ad hoc tribunals.10 4 For example, the ICTR has had
large legitimacy problems in Rwanda, which eventually led to the Rwandan
government temporarily suspending cooperation with it.'0 5 The Rwandan
government's lack of cooperation had severe negative effects on getting travel
documents issued and allowing witnesses to appear. 10 6 The government was
obstructionist despite an agreement that the prosecution was necessary.'0 7 By
See Matthew I. Kupferberg, Note, Balkan War Cnmes Trials:Forum Selection, 17 BC Intl & Comp L
Rev 375, 399 (1994).
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105 See Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of InternationalCriminalProsecutionsin Africa, 31 Fordham Intl L
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limiting prosecutorial discretion, any international forum operating in a
sovereign nation acts more as a machine, mechanically applying the law, than an
institution, arbitrarily exercising discretion.' This difference in perception can
have large effects on the perceived legitimacy of the court. A mens rea standard
of purpose does not rely as heavily on prosecutorial discretion for its successful
application, so it better binds potential forums. This binding both prevents
potential defendants from creating immunity for themselves and increases the
overall legitimacy of the forum.
2. Limiting Discretion Limits the Especially Likely Potential for
Abuse of Discretion
The necessity of some sort of regime change to enable a genocide
prosecution of top government officials opens up the possibility of victor's
justice by the new regime. Prosecutorial discretion is not an effective tool in
these situations because prosecutors are likely to abuse that discretion. While the
UN or neutral third parties can be expected to evenhandedly prosecute a
genocide charge, the vast scope of jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention
creates a greater-than-normal risk of an abusive prosecutor. By limiting
discretion, a stricter mens rea requirement would cabin potential abuse of that
discretion.
3. Overlapping Jurisdiction Prevents a Large Role for Prosecutorial
Discretion
The chief problem preventing a large role for prosecutorial discretion in
the criminal adjudication of any law subject to universal jurisdiction is the lack of
a sole prosecutor to exercise discretion. The UN, the International Criminal
Court ("ICC"), and all states party to the Genocide Convention may prosecute
genocide. While there are methods to prevent these parties from subjecting
defendants to double jeopardy or non bis in idem,'09 there is, currently, no way for
one of these parties to exercise discretion and not prosecute a defendant which is
binding on other parties. In fact, the opposite is true. The ICC's mandate is to
prosecute only when a state has been "unwilling or unable" to prosecute."0
Thus, one prosecutor deliberately, and in good faith, choosing to abstain from
prosecuting is not binding on another prosecutor. This lack of coordination
requires all prosecutors to make the same decision, essentially independently,
108
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about a given set of circumstances and creates a terrible model for prosecutorial
discretion. Thus, prosecutorial discretion is not an effective means for governing
an expansive notion of accomplice liability because international law does not
have a reliable method to exercise that discretion.
F. A PURPOSE STANDARD DOES NOT EXCULPATE ALL
CORPORATE OR OTHER DUAL-PURPOSE DEFENDANTS
A third criticism of following the minority approach to accomplice mens
rea is that it would amount to a blanket exculpation of corporate defendants. A
corporate defendant can claim for most, if not all actions, that the purpose of
the conduct was profit. However, this is a mischaracterization of the purpose
requirement. The manufacturers of Zyklon B, the drug the Nazis used in their
gas chambers, attempted this defense."' But a purpose standard does not require
the genocidal intent to be the primary purpose; a significant purpose will suffice.
Thus, the manufacturers satisfied the purpose test because the effectiveness of
their product in killing was a secondary purpose, in that it increased the demand
for their product and, consequently, their profits." 2
The secondary purpose argument is not a purpose-based "hook" for top
government actions similar to Mugabe's fast-track land reform, as Mugabe did
not even have a secondary desire to destroy the white farmers. The death of the
white farmers created international criticism and damaged the Zimbabwean
economy more than a peaceful land-seizure would have. Britain's initial
acquiescence to the land reform policy, wide-scale white emigration from
Zimbabwe, and the eventual downfall of the Zimbabwean economy belie this
fact. Mugabe wanted mobilized, energetic, and rewarded supporters, not killers.
So genocide would not even be a secondary purpose of the program.
VI. CONCLUSION
The relatively recent rise in the use of the Genocide Convention to
prosecute atrocities throughout the world has created discrepancies in how it is
administered. One of the most notable discrepancies is the mens rea
requirement for accomplice liability. Courts are divided as to whether an
accomplice must assist a genocide with the purpose of committing genocide or
whether mere knowledge of the principal's intent suffices for prosecution. The
enactment of fast-track land reform in Zimbabwe provides a good example of
111 See Doug Cassel, CorporateAiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6
Nw J Ind Hum Rts 304, 335 (2008), referencing Trialof Bruno Tescb and Two Others, 1 Law Reports
of Trials of War Crim 93 (1947) (Brit Mil Ct, Hamburg, 1-8 Mar 1946).
112
See Cassel, 6 NwJ Intl Hum Rts at 335 (cited in note 111).
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conduct that would be prohibited under the Genocide Convention under a
knowledge-based approach, but would not be criminalized under a purposebased approach. The role the Genocide Convention plays in mobilizing the
international community, as well as the preference in international law for
limited prosecutorial discretion, provide reasons against criminalizing such
conduct, while the multiple methods of attaching liability for genocide---direct,
accomplice, and command responsibility-show that exceptions like land
reform would be confined to only a few scenarios.
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